Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968

Graeme S. Mount is a professor of history at Laurentian University. He
is the author of Canada’s Enemies: Spies and Spying in the Peaceable
Kingdom, and Chile and the Nazis, and the coauthor of Invisible and
Inaudible in Washington: American Policies To

The relationship between Lester Pearson and Lyndon Johnson is well
known. Until Pearson delivered unsolicited advice on the Vietnam War
during a Philadelphia speech in April 1965, relations between the two
had been cordial, even friendly. After Pearson broke the “diplomatic
rules” by implicitly criticizing U.S. policy while on U.S. soil,
Johnson marginalized him. Nor did U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
National Security Adviser Walt Rostow admire Pearson’s Secretary of
State for External Affairs, Paul Martin Sr., whom they regarded as an
interfering ignoramus. What is left for Donaghy to add?

Indeed, Donaghy confirms conventional wisdom. His opening sentence is
“Lyndon Johnson ignored Lester Pearson.” He then discusses the
Philadelphia speech and its aftermath. He confirms that Rusk and Rostow
did not respect Martin. However, Donaghy does more than that. His
opening pages provide an excellent summary of American–Canadian
relations from 1945 until 1963, when Pearson became prime minister. He
discusses the Auto Pact and Walter Gordon’s objections to it, as well
as Gordon’s controversial budget. As a historian at Canada’s
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and one of the
editors of the series Documents on Canadian External Relations, Donaghy
is probably as well informed as any single person on the Canadian
documentation available, and he has used it well. Also, given the 2002
publication date of his book, he has had access to more U.S. sources
than have earlier writers.

There are omissions. Donaghy does not mention Johnson’s last-minute
decision to make a flying visit to Expo ’67, or his lack of interest
about Pearson’s thoughts on the pending Six Day War in the Middle East
(even though Pearson had won a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in that
part of the world not quite 11 years earlier), or the Johnson
administration’s failure to frighten Pearson and Martin with the
spectre of a Communist takeover of British Guiana. Yet, the
essentials—economic concerns and the Vietnam War—are discussed at
length. This is an excellent book.