Canada and the Middle East: The Foreign Policy of a Client State

David A. Lenarcic teaches history at Wilfrid Laurier University in
Waterloo.

This book maintains that post-World War II Canadian foreign policy in
the Middle East has shifted from a middle-power role in regional
politics to one that focuses on less-contentious social and economic
issues while following American dictates on more-crucial
international-affairs questions. The rapid waning of British and Western
European influence in the Middle East, coupled with its steady
replacement by that of a Cold War-fixated United States, resulted in
Canada’s gradually abandoning the Pearsonian conciliatory diplomacy it
customarily practised within the NATO alliance. The subordinate nature
of Canadian policy during the Gulf War of 1990-91 constitutes the
“apex” of this fundamental transformation from “independent
mediator” to “client state actor.”

The main strength of this compact study is its clear and concise
summary of events; it provides a very useful narrative. The analysis,
however, is thought-provoking but problematic. Why Canadian policy came
to approximate American policy over time is not fully explained.
Moreover, the evidence supporting the author’s thesis is far from
overwhelming. His primary sources are almost exclusively of the
“official” variety; notably absent are interviews with key
decision-makers. And is it accurate to label Canada a “client state”
if the author acknowledges that even as its Middle East policy became
“subservient” in the political sphere it remained “independent”
in the economic and social ones?

A deeper problem is one of perspective. On the basis of this account,
one would have difficulty remembering that Canada’s alleged
“transgression” in straying from its traditional peacekeeping role
during the Gulf War had its own precedent in the nation’s response to
another threat to collective security—the Korean conflict—when
Pearson was Minister for External Affairs. It is noteworthy that
Canada’s participation in that endeavor did not prevent it from
subsequently donning the mantle of peacekeeper. That fact alone might
cast doubt on the author’s conclusion that Canada’s involvement in
the Gulf War “destroyed” its traditional peacekeeping role.