Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord

P.F. McKenna was librarian at the Police Academy, Brampton, Ontario.

The essays contained in this volume constitute the proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium which was held March 26-27, 1981, at the Royal Military College of Canada, in Kingston, Ontario. The six essays presented in this work are uniformly well written and interesting. The authors are academic historians who have each dealt with the complex political arrangements found in a variety of alliances. The symposium directors limited the papers to those dealing with coalitions in the twentieth century.

The first essay presents an overview of the origins and effects of military coalitions over the last century. The second essay examines the Austro-German Alliance 1914-1918 and the significant contributions made by the German side of that coalition. The following essay, by Ulrich Trumpener, looks at the military alliance between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918. Professor Trumpener attempts to show that the two powers cooperated quite well during the bulk of the war The author indicates that Ottoman service was quite attractive to aspiring, young German officers. Apparently in 1915 Erwin Rommel (then a lieutenant) learned Turkish in the hope that he might be stationed there. In the next essay J.L. Granatstein provides a profile of Hume Wrong and also deals with the development of the “functional principle” of diplomacy. Hume Wrong was a most interesting Canadian and one of the country’s first professional diplomats. His contribution to the development of an independent and autonomous Canadian presence in international politics is clearly outlined. The following essay examines the Soviet military’s understanding and implementation of coalition warfare. John Erickson traces some of the continuities between Imperial Russia and Soviet military theory and strategy. He clearly underscores the profound Soviet fear of, and careful strategic planning against, hostile “capitalist coalitions.” Erickson shows that the Soviet Union could sustain an effective coalition with these “imperialist” powers. This coalition, however, gave way rather rapidly to an “internal coalition” characterized by the “Sovietization” of the East European military establishment as the concluding chords of World War II were being struck. In the age of nuclear war and global coalitions the Soviet military strategists continue to have a deep understanding of the potential of coalition warfare. The final essay, by Ian Nish, deals with Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. This doctrine, advanced by Japan, was designed to outline and clarify her relationship with other Asians in 1940. The doctrine was an essential part of Japan’s war effort and provided the rhetorical support for her supremacy in East Asia. Professor Nish refers to the ideas behind the “New Order” and “Co-Prosperity” as being “of a rather sophisticated kind.” This presentation is altogether too thin. He should have developed these notions more thoroughly since they appear, on the surface, to be fairly pedestrian. One is not hard pressed to list examples of superficial politicians who proclaim the dawning of a new order, a new era, or a new deal!

This book contains an adequate index and each article is equipped with footnotes leading the serious student of coalition warfare to further works.

The collection will reward the general reader and the historical scholar.