Tug of War: The Canadian Victory That Opened Antwerp

Dominick Graham was Associate Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies and Professor of History at the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton.

This is an account of the clearance of the Scheldt and the opening of the port of Antwerp to supplies for the Allies between 4 September, when the port was captured, and the end of November 1944, when the port was operational. The authors argue that the campaign ought to have been unnecessary. They blame Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery for not ordering the British Second Army to push the Germans beyond the eastern entrance to the Beveland peninsula and General Creragh’s First Canadian Army to press forward to Breskens at the mouth of the Scheldt in early September. The omission allowed the German 15th Army to escape the disaster that had befallen the 7th in Normandy and to defend the Scheldt stubbornly for nearly three months.

The Second Army having missed its chance to take the north bank of the Scheldt, it was 2 Canadian Division’s task in early October, almost a month later. They advanced from polder to polder to the causeway at the western end of South Beveland. Across the causeway lay the island-fortress of Walcheren. The bloodiest and most depressing episode of the campaign, the attempt to cross to Walcheren by the 5th Brigade, then occurred. A Resistance member had pointed out a better way across the mud of the Slooe, and it was used by the 52nd Lowland Division, with few casualties, after 5th Brigade had been relieved. In the meanwhile 3rd Canadian, the 4th (Armoured) and the Poles were fighting to clear the southern bank and Breskens. All this in rain, mud, and floods, which confined attacks to the tops of banks and hence narrow fronts: there was no rest between operations and an increasing and infinitely depressing dearth of trained replacements. Only volunteers were permitted to leave Canada.

Finally came the assault on Walcheren across the mouth of the Scheldt after heavy bombers had broken the seaward embankment to flood the interior and all German communications. This last stage of the campaign by commandoes, the 52nd Division, and gallant and self-sacrificing Royal Navy small boat units was a triumph of determination in the face of obstacles placed in the way by the Royal Air Force, the weather, and the brave enemy.

Denis Whitaker commanded the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in 2nd Division, and its operations are vividly described. The Belgian and Dutch Resistance also receives well-deserved attention, although the Whitakers make it clear that neither was used to advantage in the early stages. The book is well written and well researched. The passages where the reader is mired in detail are mercifully few. Historians will enjoy extracts from Guy Simonds’ papers — still closed to them — and learn more on controversial subjects, namely the Canadian reinforcement crisis, the rejection of Montgomery’s plan for the pursuit beyond the Seine, and his failure to secure the Scheldt and destroy the German 15th Army.

I can recommend this book to every Canadian interested in his country’s part in World War II.