The Logic and Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought

Patrick Colgan is the former executive director of the Canadian Museum
of Nature.

A University of Toronto philosopher, Wilson reprints previously
published materials as seven studies on the new philosophythat was
needed to support the equally new enterprise of 17th-century science.
The seven studies successively examine the differing responses of
Baconian empiricists and Cartesian rationalists to Aristotelianism,
corresponding attacks on traditional logic, the role of the logic of
Petrus Ramus in Berkeley’s philosophy based on qualities rather than
substance, the inductive empiricism of Hobbes and Hume, causation (the
subject of two studies), and Descartes’ defence of traditional
metaphysics.

Wilson is surely correct to emphasize these philosophical changes, and
to criticize historians and philosophers for ignoring them. However,
rather than concentrating on them, his presentation meanders extensively
over a vast sweep of philosophical history from Plato through
scholastics and early moderns to contemporaries. The writings of many
philosophers are scrutinized with great care for their bearing on the
issues at hand, although unfortunately among scientists only Galileo and
Newton are considered in any detail. The evaluations are carefully
constructed, especially when considering such key issues as the changes
in metaphysics and the triumph of empiricism over rationalism. Some
conclusions are of much interest, such as Locke’s achievements against
the metaphysicians, the structure of Hobbes’s philosophy, and the
crucial contributions of Hume. Regrettably, other lengthy sections, such
as that on the ontological argument for god, are tangential at best. In
his analysis, Wilson considers the arguments of other commentators
appropriately and uses symbolic logic and Venn and Euler diagrams. The
very inadequate index reflects the difficulty of tracking the text.

The strength of this long and wide-ranging volume lies in its scholarly
thoroughness. A lack of focus and the loss of conclusions in the fine
detail are its major weaknesses. Is an entire paragraph from Aquinas
given twice (pp. 113 and 432) and one from Aristotle thrice (pp. 107,
273, and 335) because the reader is presumed to have a short memory, or
because the editor dozed? A book for avid specialists only.