The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations

Ryan Touhey is a Ph.D. candidate in the faculty of history at the
University of Waterloo.

Based on a thorough examination of archival materials including recently
declassified and previously unexplored Canadian and Anglo-American
files, Chapnick reassesses Canada’s participation in the founding of
the United Nations from January 1942 to October 1945, analyzing the
efforts of policy-makers and domestic attitudes. Canadians continue to
enthusiastically embrace internationalism and the United Nations, with
the misplaced belief that they perform a far greater role in the
organization than they do particularly in peacekeeping operations.
Chapnick persuasively suggests that this is not a modern phenomenon. The
Second World War prompted Canadians to reconsider their world view and
they soon regarded their politicians, diplomats, and themselves as
playing a leading part in creating the United Nations as a “middle
power.” The trouble with this interpretation, according to Chapnick,
is that the Canadian government and its officials were far less involved
and influential in shaping the postwar peace than is commonly believed.
Canadians’ inflated sense of importance was unrealistic for a nation
that in 1939 was relatively insignificant, and has been promoted by
national histories, journalists, and some of the actors themselves. In
particular, Lester Pearson publicly championed Canada as a “middle
power,” and it was his view that resonated with war-weary Canadians.

In fact, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and most of his officials in the
department of external affairs had no designs for Canada as a middle
power. A cautious and gradual role in creating the embryonic United
Nations was preferred. This was precipitated by a lack of immediate
postwar foreign policy planning; inexperience with external affairs; and
policy infighting between realists and idealists, with the latter
failing to win the support of King and his advisers. Moreover, the great
powers were uninterested in allowing Canada and other like-minded states
to play a major role in the U.N. at the cost of their own influence.
Canadians remained largely oblivious to these constraints, failing to
appreciate the minor role they were actually playing.

Rather than looking at this period as how Canada changed the world,
Chapnick suggests that it is time to consider how planning for the
postwar world changed Canada. Ottawa’s role in the U.N. discussions
was crucial in developing a new national image. Although it might be
considered too specialized for initial undergraduate courses, this fine
study fills an important gap in Canadian foreign policy historiography.
It persuasively challenges long-standing romantic interpretations of
Canada’s involvement in the formation of the United Nations during the
Second World War.