Moose Pastures and Mergers: The Ontario Securities Commission and the Regulation of Share Markets in Canada, 1940-1980

Terry A. Crowley is a professor of history at the University of Guelph,
and the former editor of the journal, Ontario History. He is the author
of Agnes Macphail and the Politics of Equality and Canadian History to
1967, and the coauthor of The College on

Before the gigantic Enron and Worldcom disasters in the United States,
there were Windfall Oils & Mines, Atlantic Acceptance, Prudential
Financial, and Bre-X in Canada—all examples in recent decades of
gigantic corporate corruption and manipulation at immense investor
expense. Those who believe in the superior ability of markets to solve
most human problems might simply shrug their shoulders and say that
since there is a sucker born every day, caveat emptor (buyer beware)
provides the only sure guide for individual financial success. Those
hurt in such corporate financial disasters often demand that government
provide regulation to prevent the fraud and dishonesty seen so
frequently in stock markets. Others argue that governments need to
establish a level playing field so that insiders do not profit at the
expense of outsiders who do not have access to privileged information,
particularly at the time of corporate mergers.

Christopher Armstrong is a distinguished York University historian who
specializes in business and economic history. His Moose Pastures and
Mergers provides a rich overview of the complexities surrounding the
development and regulation of securities markets in Canada. (The
“moose pastures” in the book’s title refer to the activities of
fly-by-night mining companies promoting stock in ground with vaunted
potential to strike it rich, but with no value otherwise.) Written in
readable prose that readily identifies both villains and heroes in the
country’s financial history, the book will provide essential reading
for those interested in Canadian history, investors, securities lawyers,
and business journalists. The calamities recounted in this volume leave
no doubt that legislative regulation of markets is preferable to the
laxity that prevailed when self-regulation was attempted.