Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies

Edward R. Grenda was a freelance writer, lecturer and consultant who lived in Kingston, Ontario.

Logic is a branch of philosophy which is frequently and frightfully misunderstood by lay people and those who profess to know something about thinking — namely, academics and intellectuals. Fundamentally, logic is the study of the nature of reasoning. It is a prescriptive discipline dealing with the general rules for correct reasoning; that is, how we ought to reason. It is, then, not a classroom drill, but an integral structural component of every thought an individual has. One cannot escape it. To criticize logic, one must use logic itself, a task akin to Munchhausen’s feat of extricating himself from a swamp by pulling on his whiskers. There is only one logic and it is the same for everyone; a denial of this can only be prompted by willful obfuscation or ignorance of the nature of logic.

It must be emphasized that logic is not a descriptive science describing and explaining how we actually think. This is the domain of psychology, not logic. But to describe or explain, we must use logic correctly.

The authors of this useful volume examine in minute detail the nature of argument and the defects which sully it in the course of daily conversations, speeches, moral and political discussions, and scholarly works. These defects, which are fallacies, are literally infractions of the fundamental rules of logic. The authors nicely balance the explanatory aspects with concrete examples of virtually all the major types of fallacies and demonstrate the absurd implications which flow, thereby impairing understanding and clarity. The manner in which this is done makes the essential points clear to those already well versed in logic and to those who encounter its delights for the first time.

The authors also add several chapters centering on formal logic, theory of deduction. These are crisply, if not austerely, dealt with. Consequently, the tyro may experience some difficulty in understanding the processes described. But guidance by an experienced teacher will alleviate any initial apprehensions.

My chief dissatisfaction with this book lies in its treatment of induction (i.e., a general conclusion deduced from a plethora of singular observation statements). The authors proceed as though Karl Popper’s noted criticisms of induction never existed. Indeed, Popper contends there is no induction problem because the process itself does not exist, either logically or empirically. Neither do the authors advert to the stimulating literature Popper’s strictures have generated. This omission is surely a grave oversight; it creates confusion and even slovenly argument — in a book dedicated to curtailing these intellectual blights!

In a book of this nature, the authors should have devoted some consideration to an issue which can undermine all their efforts and foster unreasonable expectations in the learning of logic. The propensity to reason correctly and critically on any issue is contingent on the individual’s desire to strive for true answers rather than caving in to the urge to embrace a cherished belief or theory if the conclusions arrived at are not congenial to it. The latter is the most powerful inhibitor of good thinking. There lies the nub. Logic will only assist if we permit it. It is not necessarily the redeeming panacea it is painted to be.

These animadversions aside, this book deserves to be on the reading list of every first-year university student.