Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography

W.H. Heick is a professor of History at Wilfrid Laurier University.

This biography strengthens the belief in the idiocy of warfare. But once accepting this aspect of human frailty, the biography has to be judged a very fine presentation and analysis of the career of a historically significant Canadian.

D.G. Dancocks’ work builds on and supersedes Hugh Urquhart’s Arthur Currie (Toronto: Dent, 1950). Dancocks has made extensive use of the primary and secondary sources that have become available since Urquhart’s book was published 18 years after Currie’s death. He makes pointed references to the occasions when his conclusions are contrary to those of other historians.

Dancocks follows the very logical divisions that Urquhart used: prewar, war, and McGill eras. Part One is the brief story of Currie’s maturation and move from his birthplace in Ontario to Victoria, B.C. In Victoria he worked as a real estate developer, but with success never assured. Even this initial period of his life was dominated by his great interest and work in the militia. In this part-time career he functioned most effectively.

Part Two is the much longer exposition of Currie’s career during World War I. His rise in rank to Lieutenant-General in command of the Canadian Corps of over 100,000 men is the story of a personal as well as a national development. While Currie honed the personal qualities requisite to military leadership, the Corps became probably the best fighting unit on either side of the Western Front, and Canada matured from colony to ally. Dancocks notes all these elements.

Currie was a general of the old Napoleonic era in the sense of working hard to keep in touch with his men while in combat. Such action was quite contrary to that of most of his fellow generals, who lost touch with the fortunes of the multitude of men serving under them in this war of attrition. On the other hand, Currie was in the vanguard in learning how to use the men and resources at hand in an imaginative manner to achieve victory. He learned from his own involvement in the battle of Festubert, 1915, that there was no substitute for preparation. From studying French strategy and tactics at Verdun, 1916, Currie reinforced his earlier conclusion re preparation to build his basic principles of battle: combine artillery fire with troop movement to achieve surprise; expend shells, not men! He determined to train the artillery to hit specific targets, not just fire shells indiscriminately, and to train the infantry down to the platoon level to understand their task, having them make extensive use of maps to accomplish this task. It was what Currie called using common sense. Dancocks joins the historiographical debate by accepting the contention that Currie’s achievements were revolutionary. With the men thus extensively trained, the Corps was never to give up a position once consolidated. In the Hundred Days before the end of the war the Corps confronted 47 German divisions altogether and defeated them.

Part Three relates Currie’s work as Principal of McGill University, which duties he performed much better than most people expected. He also fought for more adequate recognition by the nation of the work the soldiers had accomplished in France through the provision of fair support for veterans’ post-war needs, particularly in the health care area. Lastly, hating warfare as a result of his experiences, he gave active support to the movement for disarmament on a universal basis.