Operation Friction, 1990-1991

Dean F. Oliver is Senior Historian at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa.

There are two standard criticisms of official military histories: that
they appear too soon after the events they describe to afford
appropriate detachment; that inefficient bureaucrats take far too long
to produce them at all. Operation Friction avoids both pitfalls. Coming
just six years after the Gulf War of 1990–91, it is nevertheless a
detailed, sophisticated treatment of Canadian military involvement in
the conflict that meets the tests of good scholarship and readability.

The latter hurdle it clears just barely. Replete with acronyms, mission
facts, and logistical and administrative minutiae, the text is always
dense and, at times, annoying. Passive voice proliferates, style does
not: a typically convoluted comment on factors affecting troop morale
notes that “the influence of public opinion was far from minimal.”
Military buffs might not mind such plodding; general readers may be
occasionally hard-pressed.

But they will also be rewarded for perseverance. Media coverage of
Canada’s Gulf War missed many of its key elements, including the
complexity of the supply arrangements, the nature of interallied
cooperation, and the professional challenges posed by the high tempo of
both air and sea missions. Morin and Gimblett cover all brilliantly.
Important elements of this story must await the release of Cabinet
records, but with their privileged access the authors, serving officers
both, have produced a comprehensive volume that is also refreshingly
honest. Operation BROADSWORD, for example, “convincingly demonstrated
that sending a mechanized brigade group into battle was not within the
scope of the Canadian Forces as they then existed” and constitutes
“an embarrassing footnote for the army.” Nine years later, defence
department officials continue to publicly contradict their own staff
studies. The first readers of this essential volume should be the
authors’ co-workers at National Defence Headquarters.