The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology During the Second World War
Description
Contains Photos, Bibliography, Index
$40.00
ISBN 0-8020-5996-1
DDC 940.54'8
Author
Publisher
Year
Contributor
J.L. Granatstein, distinguished research professor emeritus of history
at York University, is the author of Who Killed Canadian History?, and
co-author of The Canadian 100: The 100 Most Influential Canadians of the
20th Century and the Dictionary of Canad
Review
During World War II, Canadian science made great strides forward. In
1939, Canada’s universities were small and underfunded, the science
faculties very weak. Government research was limited to the National
Research Council—which, while it had good leadership and some skilled
scientists, was similarly underfunded. The war changed all this: the
need was urgent and the money available virtually unlimited. Canada’s
relations with its two major allies, Britain and the United States, also
pushed and pulled Canadian science in new directions. Avery’s book is
a well-researched account of these changes and their implications. The
major research emphases were on radar, high explosives, chemical and
biological warfare, and nuclear research. There were successes and
failures, to be sure. The radar research saw large resources devoted to
the production of inferior equipment that greatly hampered the Royal
Canadian Navy’s antisubmarine efforts. The explosive and
bacteriological warfare efforts were more successful, though happily the
latter did not have to be employed. The atomic bomb research, which
initially involved Canada’s simply providing a safe home for British
researchers, developed well, too: Canada emerged from the war as one of
the three leaders in nuclear research. But always there was tension
between regarding which master to follow—the United States or the
United Kingdom. At the beginning and end of the story, there was no
doubt: the British were our leaders in 1939, the Americans in 1945. But
the intervening struggle for control and direction is well worth
recounting. So too is the story of security and spies. The Gouzenko
defection in September 1945 lifted the lid on Moscow’s efforts to
secure information, aided and abetted by Canadian scientists whose
loyalty lay with Communism rather than with Canada.
This is a useful book, most especially for its exhaustive research.
Regrettably, however, Avery’s grasp of military matters is rather less
impressive than his scientific mastery.