Meech Lake: The Inside Story

Agar Adamson is the author of Letters of Agar Adamson, 1914–19 and former chair of the Department of Political Science at Acadia University in Nova Scotia.

When Pierre Trudeau took his “walk in the snow” in February 1984, he
left to his successors two unenviable “bequests,” both of which
continue to haunt Canada. The first was the deficit, which still
bedevils us. The second was the constitutional debate he forced on the
country in 1982.

This book is the story, told by a member of the Ontario delegation who
was there, of the attempt to rectify the second of Trudeau’s
unfortunate legacies and obtain Quebec’s participation in the process
of executive federalism as well as in the constitutional amending
process adapted in 1982. The Meech Lake Accord (MLA) was designed to
make Canada whole again and to honor the commitment made to those in
Quebec who voted “no” in 1980. That this process failed is a
tragedy, perhaps of Sophoclean proportions.

All is not lost, however, if we can profit from our mistakes. That is
why this work is important—it permits us to learn from the errors of
1987-1990.

Why did the MLA fail? On this issue some may disagree with Monahan. He
is of the view that the “distinct society” clause was the problem.
It is true that this symbolic gesture did prove to be the nucleus around
which dissenters—including Trudeau, Clyde Wells, the Charter
Canadians, and the aboriginal and women’s groups—coalesced. It is
also true that the latter groups had just cause, but were those groups
against the MLA, or was the MLA merely a means to fight a different
battle?

Monahan argues convincingly that “Wells’s decision to prevent a
vote being taken . . . was an affront to the principle of responsible
government.” Wells’s affront to responsible government and
Mulroney’s “roll the dice” description of the week-long June 1990
meeting killed the Accord.

The process of closed meetings (executive federalism) was also
misunderstood by Canadians. But, Monahan argues, there probably was not
an acceptable alternative. The MLA was a compromise; like all such
arrangements, it had its strengths and its weaknesses. Most importantly,
it would have brought the country together as one.

In his final chapter, Monahan charts “The Way Ahead.” This approach
has its merits. As he points out, many of Quebec’s “demands,” as
put forth in the Allaire Report, can be put in place without amending
the Constitution. He also argues in favor of a referendum, perhaps one
in which Canadians outside Quebec can put forth their proposals to be
voted on by Quebec. His warnings of the possible impact of Quebec’s
separation are dire. His argument is that if Quebec leaves, Canada has
no Constitution: “The moment Quebec leaves, the existing Constitution
becomes a dead letter.” Not a happy thought.

The author includes a number of useful appendices, a chronology, and
extensive endnotes.