The Big Red Machine: How the Liberal Party Dominates Canadian Politics

Graeme S. Mount is a professor of history at Laurentian University. He
is the author of Canada’s Enemies: Spies and Spying in the Peaceable
Kingdom, Chile and the Nazis, and The Diplomacy of War: The Case of
Korea.

Stephen Clarkson has written a magnificent history of the Liberal Party
of Canada from the rebellions of 1837 until the federal election of
2004. His focus, however, is the period from 1974 until 2004—the era
of Trudeau, Turner, Chrétien, and Paul Martin. At that, Clarkson is
more concerned with the elections themselves than with the periods
between the elections, although he cannot, of course, separate the two.

Clarkson argues, justifiably, that the party that has governed Canada
for 78 of the past 110 years and won 19 of the previous 28 elections
merits attention. He notes the kinds of people who voted Liberal,
reviews Liberal platforms and methods of operating, and demonstrates
that the first-past-the-post system of choosing an MP has usually, but
not always (1958 being the most notable exception), favoured the
Liberals.

Clarkson finds Canadian politics unpredictable. Who could have foreseen
that a millionaire without political experience (Trudeau) and Jean
Chrétien could win multiple majority governments, while John Turner and
Paul Martin would fail to do so?

Trudeau, says Clarkson, learned from his 1972 mistakes, and his
minority government became so proactive that he won a majority in 1974.
The day he won that majority, however, his government began to
disintegrate, and Clarkson lists issues: irresponsible fiscal
management, RCMP wrongdoing, and the cynical acceptance of Jack Horner
(one of the most reactionary Conservatives) into the cabinet. After the
1979 loss, Trudeau learned some hard lessons and won in 1980. Turner’s
1984 election call was premature. Clarkson titles the Chrétien era
“Power without Purpose” and attributes Chrétien’s success in 1993
as much to Conservative errors as to his own party’s merits. The
divided nature of the Opposition proved a decisive factor in 1997 and
2000.

Clarkson attributes the narrow Liberal victory of 2004 more to the
public’s fear of Conservatives than to Liberal appeal, and he sees
parallels between Turner and Martin. Both had been finance ministers.
Both left cabinet. Both returned as quasi-Opposition leaders, in large
measure repudiating their predecessors and alienating their
predecessors’ supporters. Successful Liberal leaders have not behaved
that way.

This book should be a bible for campaign managers.