Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 20

Graeme S. Mount is a professor of history at Laurentian University. He
is also the author of Canada’s Enemies: Spies and Spying in the
Peaceable Kingdom, and the co-author of Invisible and Inaudible in
Washington: American Policies Toward Canada.

In 1954, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent became the first Canadian head
of government to make a round-the-world tour. The United States and
Canada reached agreement on construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway,
making it possible for European tourists to sail across the Atlantic to
ports on the Great Lakes. The Pinetree Radar Line had been under
construction for some years, and the U.S. and Canadian governments were
making arrangements for the more northerly Mid-Canada and DEW (Distant
Early Warning) lines. Lester Pearson, minister of external affairs,
worried about U.S. policies of “massive retaliation” against any
Soviet threat and received assurances from the U.S. secretary of state,
John Foster Dulles, that Americans would not use nuclear weapons
irresponsibly. These are among the many pieces of history documented in
this book.

In 1954, Canadian forces left Korea and first became involved in
Vietnam. By mid-year the Korean situation seemed sufficiently stable
that Canadian forces were able to return home. A picture of the Canadian
graves at the United Nations cemetery near Pusan serves as a reminder of
the 314 Canadians who had died during the Korean War.

The documents show that negotiating some arrangement for Korea at the
1954 Geneva peace conference was a highly complicated matter. Sixteen
countries, including Canada, had fought as part of the United Nations
Command during the Korean War. All had to agree among themselves before
they could negotiate with the Communist enemies—China, the USSR, and
North Korea.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was another problem.
According to the ceasefire terms of 1953, which ended the actual
fighting in Korea, five “neutral” countries were to inspect North
and South Korea and prevent renewed violence. The United States and
South Korea were certain that the Communist “neutrals,” soldiers
from Poland and Czechoslovakia, were spying in South Korea. At the same
time, soldiers from the Western neutrals, Sweden and Switzerland, could
not move very freely in North Korea. Canadian diplomats feared that
whatever happened to the NNSC might set a precedent for the
International Joint Commission in Vietnam, of which Canada became a
member in 1954. The involvement of Canadian soldiers there lasted 19
years, until 1973.

Although 1954 was the year after the death of Joseph Stalin, Cold War
considerations remained paramount. NATO strategy was that Soviet
invaders must be defeated early, before they could penetrate deeply into
Western Europe. To do this, NATO needed West German soldiers, but there
was a dilemma. How could West Germany remilitarize without alarming the
French?

Because of restrictions imposed upon Canadian diplomats in Moscow, the
St. Laurent government imposed formidable red tape on any Soviet
diplomats who wanted to travel more than 75 miles outside Ottawa. The
permit-to-travel forms that they then had to complete enabled the RCMP
to trail them on visits to any other destination outside the national
capital area.

The Canadian government wanted to supply Greece with F–86 aircraft
and supply teachers so that Turkish pilots could learn English. U.S.
authorities wanted Canadians to stay far from Greece in case Canadian
and U.S. perceptions of what should be done did not always coincide.

The Commonwealth played a more important role in Canadian diplomacy in
1954 than it does now. David Johnson, Canada’s permanent
representative at the United Nations, thought it tolerable for the UN to
debate apartheid in South Africa or French rule in North Africa, but not
British control of Cyprus. Unless what he called “commonsense” ended
the anticolonialist agitation, Johnson warned, “the colonial powers
will come to regard the United Nations as a liability.” Canada began
to assist India, Pakistan, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) through the
Colombo Plan and wondered whether the Colombo Plan should expand to
include non-Commonwealth countries.

In 1954, La Francophonie did not exist, and Canada did not belong to
the Organization of American States. High-ranking Canadian politicians
and diplomats consulted regularly with their counterparts in the United
Kingdom and India. Norman Robertson, Canada’s high commissioner
(ambassador) in London, expected that South Africa would oppose the
admission of black African states. Robertson foresaw that the Gold Coast
(now Ghana) would be the first black African colony to achieve
independence, with Nigeria and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
not far behind. One official considered the possibility of what he
called “a ‘horse trade’ between South Africa and India over the
Gold Coast and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.” In other
words, South Africa might accept the Gold Coast provided that India
would accept the FRN.