The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Community or Alliance?

Bonnie White is a Ph.D. candidate in the History Department at McMaster
University.

The story of the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has been told before, but never with such careful attention paid
to the personalities involved in its construction. The author challenges
the view that creating greater unity among NATO members was a uniquely
Canadian concern. He suggests that during NATO’s formative years
(1948–1957) member states had a sincere interest in developing
economic, social, and political roles for NATO beyond a military
alliance. Milloy argues that while Canadian politicians worked toward
developing NATO into a community of nations, its efforts were at times
detrimental to its intended goals.

At the centre of this study is Article 2, under which the alliance
members tried to foster an Atlantic framework by suggesting provisions
for a non-military agreement. Milloy argues that while Canada was
committed to some kind of economic collaboration between the North
Atlantic nations, Britain and the United States also became strong
advocates of Article 2 in the 1950s. Its non-military development was
appealing to British politicians who hoped to find security (especially
economic security) outside of the European matrix. The United States, in
pursuit of its own foreign policy objectives, attempted to use Article 2
to facilitate the inclusion of Turkey and Greece within the Atlantic
alliance, as well as to reduce criticisms that NATO had become too
militarized following the outbreak of the Korean War. According to
Milloy, the alliance failed because NATO members refused to make their
Atlantic relationship a priority; Britain, France, and the United States
refused to agree to foreign policy consultation; France resisted German
reintegration with the West; and Canada rejected a number of initiatives
including labour mobility and the formation of an Atlantic Assembly.

The author’s concern with redirecting the failure of Article 2 away
from Canadian policy-makers is clear, but has somewhat limited the scope
of his study. While Milloy asserts that other, unidentified, authors
have misjudged Canada’s role in the development of NATO, he is
unwilling to engage with those whom he scorns for short-sightedness.
Milloy’s book is certainly worthwhile and convincing, but a more
detailed discussion of the relevant critics would be helpful.