Blindsight and the Nature of Consciousness

Alan Belk, Ph.D., is a member of the Philosophy Department at the
University of Guelph.

One way in which cognitive science advances is through the study of
individuals whose brains don’t function “normally.” An example of
this is provided by blindsight, a condition in which an affected
subjects can respond to events within some part of their field of vision
but have no conscious awareness of such an event or of the response they
made to it. For instance, they may be able to catch a ball and have no
consciousness of having seen it, or may accurately detect the shape of
an object but think that they are “guessing” it correctly; thus, to
an observer, the person seems no different from anyone else.

If the cognitive scientist (and that’s a big “if”) can figure out
what’s missing in blindsighted people, then he or she will have also
figured out what happens in the brains of those who are not
blindsighted. Jason Holt, assistant professor of philosophy at Dalhousie
University, investigates blindsight in order to see what it can tell us
about the theories we construct about consciousness in philosophy of
mind and related areas such as epistemology and philosophy of science.

Blindsight and the Nature of Consciousness is a work of philosophy, so
if you are not comfortable with qualia, epiphenomenalism, reductionism,
eliminativism, zombies, Mary, mental states, or duality, then this is
not a book for you. However, if you are interested in consciousness (if
there is such a thing) and have at least a nodding acquaintance with the
preceding, Holt’s book is stimulating and readable. He presents a good
example of an emerging trend in philosophy of mind: using the empirical
data provided by cognitive science in order to support or reject a
philosophical theory. Holt’s more provocative conclusion about the
nature of consciousness isn’t well supported by the chapters that
precede it, but perhaps he should tackle that subject in his next book.

Given that another emergent trend in cognitive science is
interdisciplinarity, this well-designed book could be used as a
launching pad for an introductory course in philosophy of mind for
cognitive science undergraduates as well as would-be philosophers.