Pearson and Canada's Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, 1945-1957

David A. Lenarcic teaches history at Wilfrid Laurier University in
Waterloo.

In this well-written and thoroughly researched book, the author argues
that Canada’s role in arms diplomacy was that of “junior partner”
to the United States. Ottawa fully supported American efforts to
strengthen the U.S.A.’s military position vis-а-vis the U.S.S.R. or
at least win the crucial propaganda war. Above all, Canadian policy
strove to maintain a united Western front in negotiations.

However, Levitt rightly points out that if Canada failed to play the
role of mediator between East and West, neither was it merely a
mouthpiece of the United States. Canada shared many of its southern
neighbor’s Cold War assumptions and willingly defended American
positions because it sincerely believed that was the proper course of
action. On defence and security issues, Canada could not choose
nonalignment, but neither did it wish to be neutral. Canada sought to
influence and sometimes modify American behavior within these
constraints, and occasionally scored minor successes.

The author concludes that, by and large, his case study supports the
Pearson era’s designation as the “golden age” of Canadian
diplomacy. Pearson’s greatest contribution was his insistence that the
West continue to talk. Yet he could have done more to improve the
atmosphere in which negotiations were conducted. Pearson overemphasized
the Soviet military threat and was consequently less concerned with
curbing the burgeoning arms race.

Herein lies the one weakness of an otherwise excellent book. A balanced
account loses some of its objectivity when the author switches at the
very end from describing and explaining Canadian policy to speculating
about whether it was “right” or “wrong” and engaging in
counterfactual history. Levitt’s claim that “there is no evidence
that the U.S.S.R. ever intended to attack Western Europe” is
controversial, as is his labeling of Pearson as “hawkish.” That both
points are introduced in the last few pages, and therefore left
underdeveloped, diminishes their persuasiveness.

Even so, Levitt is to be commended for shedding further light on the
middle-power versus satellite debate, for filling a gap in
historiography, and for providing a provocative interpretation that will
stimulate further investigation.