Attack on Maritime Trade

James Pritchard is a history professor at Queen’s University.

The author’s topic is the strategic usefulness of war on maritime
trade and he has turned to history to examine the issue as it evolved
over the last four centuries in order to find an answer. The approach
appears to be more satisfying than the presentist analysis preferred by
some practitioners of social science. His conclusions, though
tendentious and debatable, are interesting and useful. The historical
record, he shows, does not provide clear answers concerning the benefits
to be derived from attacking maritime trade. Success often depended on
factors having little to do with the strength of navies and seems to
have been more dependent on the importance of maritime trade to, and the
degree of organizational sophistication of, victim states. The book is
arranged into two parts of approximately the same length—preceded by a
brief introduction and followed by a general conclusion that identifies
several factors that affect the usefulness of maritime anti-trade
strategy. Part 1, which contains a single extended chapter, sails the
reader through the evolution of the strategic purposes for attacking
trade from the late sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, from motives
of direct profit reflected in the laws of war at sea, to access to goods
and markets, to denial of war matériel to, and containment of, the
enemy. These aims frequently proved ineffective for a wide variety of
reasons, including the appearance and development of neutral as well as
belligerent rights at sea. Part 2—which is organized along quite
different lines into five much briefer chapters—deals with the
application of anti-trade strategies in the twentieth century: during
World War I, their effect on international diplomacy among great powers
between the wars, their failure under the League, during World War II,
and on several occasions since.

Any book that attempts an overview of one particular naval strategy
over such a long time is bound to suffer from problems, especially from
reductionism and reification, owing to its tendency to overgeneralize
and its failure to consider sufficiently the roles played by human
personality and by nonnaval factors (economic, political, diplomatic,
and military), when each case cited by the author receives such brief
treatment. Nevertheless, this volume provides a useful overview of
recent historical research on the evolution of maritime trade war that
is well worth reading, and its general conclusions may give thoughtful
pause to some who view economic sanctions, trade control, and even
blockade as useful or simple strategies to coerce recalcitrant or rogue
states in an age of multinational corporations and disappearing state
sovereignty.